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In this paper, I provide a theory for the brand-protection strategies to counterfeiting under weak intellectual
property rights. My theoretical framework has general implications for endogenous sunk cost investments
as a means of deterring counterfeiters. My model incorporates two layers of asymmetric information
that counterfeits can incur: counterfeiters fooling consumers, and buyers of counterfeits fooling other
consumers. Brands have a number of different tools at their disposal to maintain a separating equilibrium
in the face of counterfeits. One of the theoretical predictions of this study is that counterfeit entry would
induce incumbent brand to introduce new products. This helps to explain the innovation strategies
that authentic firms employ in response to entry by their counterfeiters in the real world. Authentic
prices rise if and only if the counterfeit quality is lower than a threshold level. In addition, the model
demonstrates how authentic producers could invest in self-enforcement to increase counterfeiters'
incentives to separate themselves. Better channel management through company stores and other costly
devices are forms of non-price signals and complement a company's own enforcements against counterfeits.
These predictions are validated using a unique panel data collected from Chinese shoe companies
covering the years 1993-2004. Data further reveal that companies with worse relationships with the
government invest more in various self-enforcement strategies, which are effective in reducing counterfeit
sales, and that the set of strategies are complements rather than substitutes.
Yi Qian
Department of Marketing






Brand names have signiﬁcant economic value and oﬀer a guarantee of quality that generic
products often do not match. The inherent value that brand names carry generate incentives for
imitation and counterfeiting. As a cover story in BusinessWeek declares, “the global counterfeit
business is out of control” (February 7, 2005). The World Customs Organization estimates that
512 billion Euro of traded world merchandise in 2004 may have been counterfeits (BusinessWeek,
2005). Besides the business stealing eﬀect that industries have blamed counterfeits for, counterfeit-
ing could also bring ethical costs (Gino et al, 2010). Therefore, it is pertinent to study and propose
marketing strategies that original producers could employ to appropriately countervail counterfeits.
Demand of counterfeits has been explored to some extent in the marketing literature (Bloch
et al., 1993; Cordell, et al., 1996; Wee, et al., 1995; and Tom, et al., 1998; Kwong et al. 2003;
Wilcox et al 2009; Han et al. 2010), with price, attitudes toward big branded companies, and the
need for status signaling being cited as main factors of driving counterfeit demand. On the supply
side, a few studies have examined the piracy network eﬀects (Conner and Rumelt, 1991), the le-
gal responsibilities (Olsen and Granzin, 1993), and ﬁrms’ internal organizations in complementing
weak IPR enforcement (Zhao, 2006). Enlightening as these studies are, the economic impacts of
counterfeits and the corresponding marketing strategies are not fully understood yet. Grossman
and Shapiro (1988, 1989) discuss counterfeit impacts primarily in the international trade settings
and their theoretical predictions cannot fully explain the recent empirical ﬁndings. In particular,
counterfeiters attempt to infringe upon brands and may generate asymmetric information complex-
ities to fool consumers. The ﬁndings in Qian (2008) that authentic companies strive to upgrade
quality and build company stores after counterfeiters enter demonstrate the value of disentangling
the asymmetric information for consumers. These strategies can also broadly be considered as
endogenous sunk costs (ESC), a term ﬁrst introduced by Sutton (1991).
I build upon a vertical diﬀerentiation model (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979 and 1980) with
endogenous quality and other endogenous sunk costs (ESC) to analyze brand-protection strategies
to counter counterfeit entry. I introduce quality options for the authentic producer, who chooses
quality according to its potential to yield higher proﬁts. I ﬁrst analyze price competition with a
2given quality (one per ﬁrm) under the entry game, and then look at the ex ante choice of quality.
This endogenization of quality setting helps to resolve the counter-intuitive observations in prac-
tice that authentic prices often times rise after entry by counterfeiters (Barnett, 2005). This study
derives conditions under which quality can be used as one of the key strategic decision variables to
combat counterfeits.
In addition, I model two layers of asymmetric information that counterfeits frequently gen-
erate: First, and perhaps most important, asymmetric information lies between the counterfeiter
and buyers. I model this through a fraction of consumers who cannot distinguish counterfeits from
authentic goods when they are sold at the same price. National surveys indicate that the major-
ity of consumers who purchased counterfeits (98% for cigar and 70% in footwear) thought they
were authentic. Second, some buyers may show oﬀ the counterfeits to signal their fake status. I
model such asymmetric information among consumers by a positive probability that a consumer
who wears counterfeits cannot be discerned by others and hence derive the full utility on brand
premium.
I take into account asymmetric information by building on the literature of quality un-
certainty. Price is the conventional signal for product quality, but Nelson (1974) points out the
importance of advertisement as a form of non-price signal for quality. Milgrom and Roberts (1986)
argue that prices are better signals for quality than non-price signals (notably advertisements)
unless repeated purchase is assumed. Moorthy and Srinivasan (1995) propose money back guaran-
tees as another eﬀective signal for quality. Despite the sophistication of the previous literature, the
models only considered a monopolistic market and assumed exogenous quality levels. Since counter-
feiters attempt to copy authentic products and usually produce an inferior quality, the competition
is more vertical in nature. Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999) use a simpliﬁed vertical diﬀerentiation
framework to model competition under asymmetric information. However, their models are still
conﬁned to exogenous quality, and they derive equilibrium market shares in a price-pooling equilib-
rium, which is helpful for explaining certain sector equilibria but not applicable to most counterfeit
markets.
In sum, my model captures the deﬁning characteristic of counterfeits, i.e., the intent to
deceive, by incorporating both layers of asymmetric information pertaining to counterfeits. The
3framework enriches the analysis of a broad set of instruments that authentic producers can use to
combat counterfeits: prices, quality, signaling and enforcement devices. I argue that these strategic
instruments can play important roles in the context of price rivalry and asymmetric information.The
analysis in this paper conceptualizes many insights of interest to marketing academics and practi-
tioners alike.
First, I highlight the strategic nature of quality diﬀerentiation, and analytically reveal the
two functionalities of quality upgrades in the face of counterfeiting: 1. widening quality gap to
alleviate competition, and 2. reducing asymmetric information brought by counterfeiting. Such
practices are observed among various companies, ranging from Microsoft’s software encryptions to
shoe companies’ quality upgrades in China in the mid-1990s (Qian, 2008). This study provides one
of the ﬁrst analyses on the conditions under which entry would lead to innovation. In particular,
I show that incumbent seeks to innovate only when the counterfeit quality is within a range. If
the counterfeit quality is too low, then it does not pose suﬃcient threat to induce innovation. If
the entrant quality is too high, then innovation may not be eﬀective to alleviate competition. The
predictions shed new lights on the debates in the economics literature on the relationship between
competition and innovation.
Second, I analytically parse out the price increase due to entry into its two parts: that due
to the actual quality increase, and that due to the price signaling eﬀect. Speciﬁcally, I show that
price increases are greater than would be seen if they only reﬂected actual quality increases. I show
that price signaling can be a separating strategy for the authentic company to self-diﬀerentiate
from the counterfeits. The higher price in essence results from authentic producer’s constrained
optimization to force counterfeiters out of the pooling equilibrium. This is a viable strategy when
there is a suﬃciently large fraction of expert consumers in the market who can perfectly tell coun-
terfeits apart, and will therefore only purchase counterfeits at a suﬃciently low price.
Third, the analysis here oﬀers many new strategic insights for brand management. I show
that non-price signals such as holograms could also enlarge the parameter range for a separating
equilibrium to obtain. Authentic companies’ investments in self-enforcements and in vertical in-
tegration of downstream retail stores could also eﬀectively combat counterfeits. These measures
can be broadly considered as ESC, and adds to the stream of literature on this topic (Sutton,
41991; Athey and Schmutzler, 2001). The results on the beneﬁts of establishing the company stores
complement eﬃciency arguments of downstream vertical integration in McGuire and Staelin (1983)
and provide new insights on the channel-management literature (Desai, et al., 2004; Coughlan,
Anderson, Stern and El-Ansary, 2006).
Last but not least, the main theoretical predictions are buttressed by empirical analysis of
a new panel dataset that I collected from the Chinese footwear industry. This panel data includes
detailed prices, production costs, quality dimensions, and ﬁnancial statements of a representative
sample of branded companies and their corresponding counterfeits. Stratiﬁed analysis on diﬀerent
clusters of products with counterfeit entry of diﬀerent quality levels reveal that authentic price
increases post-entry are observed mainly in the stratum of products that were infringed by rel-
atively low-quality counterfeits. In addition, companies’ self-enforcement investments are shown
to signiﬁcantly correlate with the reduction in counterfeit entry or sales. All these ﬁndings align
with the theoretical predictions, and support the intuition that supply side initiatives may be best
for countering counterfeits (Bian and Moutinho 2009; Penz and Stottinger 2008). This research
enriches a Teecean perspective: a substantial portion of the rents from innovation arise not from
technological novelty but from embedding innovation in brands and distribution systems insulated
from fringe competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model used in our
analysis. Section 3 analyzes the various endogenous sunk costs and their implications for brand
protections. Section 4 takes theoretical predictions to data and ﬁnds empirical validations. Finally,
Section 5 summarizes the managerial insights and concludes with suggestions for future research.
2 Model
Following the tradition of vertical diﬀerentiation models, I characterize a good with a quality
index si, where i indexes company i. There is at ﬁrst one original producer with the option of
producing two qualities: sL = s,sH = Ms,where M > 1. The additional unit costs of producing
the Ms quality versus the s quality is c. She opts into one quality level that yields most proﬁts.
Each consumer consumes one unit of a product or none, and derives utility U = V si−Pi if one unit
with quality si is consumed at price Pi, and U = 0 otherwise. All consumers prefer high quality,
5given the same price. However, consumer heterogeneity in taste is captured by V : the distribution
of V in the economy, f(V ), is uniform on [0,1].
When counterfeiter enters with a product of quality sc = ms,m ≤ 11, the counterfeiter and
incumbent play a duopoly game. Let Pa,Pc be the prices for the incumbent and counterfeit goods,
respectively. I assume counterfeit quality is exogenously given because counterfeiters have limited
technology available relative to authentic producers.2 I assume the marginal costs of producing the
low-quality authentic and counterfeit products are zero to simplify the model. Robustness checks
without this assumption is derived in Appendix 6.3. The sequence of events is:
1. Authentic producer chooses her quality and sets the corresponding optimal price;
2. Counterfeiter decides whether to enter. If he enters, he picks his price, recognizing that he
relies on the resemblence to sell his product due to technology limitations in matching the
authentic quality;
3. Each consumer purchases one unit from the brand or counterfeiter, or nothing.
With the intention of fooling some consumers, counterfeiters would like to wait until authentic
qualities and prices are set before setting his. Therefore, this leadership-follower game setting
is more reasonable than a Bertrand one. The results under simultaneous Bertrand moves are
qualitatively similar, and are available upon request.
2.1 Branded Monopoly without Counterfeiting
I solve the game backwards to ﬁnd the equilibrium level of prices, quality, and purchase decisions.
In the event that there is no counterfeiter, the brandname producer is the monopoly. Given quality
sa of the authentic product, the lowest valuation among consumers who purchase is V sa −Pa = 0,
implying that V = Pa
sa . This yields the demand
D(Pa) =
( R 1
V f(V )dV = 1 − V = 1 − Pa
sa if Pa < sa
0 otherwise
1Both news articles and my own data reveal that counterfeiters oﬀer inferior quality most times. The
rare scenario of equal quality by counterfeiters and the authentic producer is captured in the case of m = 1.
2Furthermore, in some countries, the counterfeiters cannot import fancy materials and equipment because
they are not legitimately-registered companies and have no permits for imports (Qian, 2008).
6The authentic producer maximizes proﬁts ΠM
a = (Pa − ca)D(Pa) w.r.t. Pa, resulting in the equi-
librium price PM
a = sa+ca




In deciding which quality level to oﬀer, the producer substitutes in the two quality values
(s or Ms) in the optimized proﬁt function above and chooses the one that yields a higher proﬁt.
In Appendix A, I establish the proof for
Lemma 1 Without counterfeits, s is oﬀered instead of Ms iﬀ c
s ≥ M −
√
M.
When higher quality would raise costs more than it would yield proﬁts, the monopoly incumbent
oﬀers a lower quality.
2.2 Market with Counterfeits
In a market where authentic and counterfeit producers coexist, the price, quality, quantity,
and other marketing dynamics are more complicated. I ﬁrst consider the case that consumers
have perfect information on quality. In some circumstances, counterfeits are sold in very diﬀerent
markets from the authentic products (Canal Street in New York City, U.S.A., for instance), or are
made of very inferior materials that one can detect instantly. However, these are certainly not the
exclusive channels for counterfeit transactions. For instance, when interviewing the branded shoe
companies and shopping malls in China, 40% of consumers told me that they or their friends had
purchased counterfeits unintentionally. I will relax the perfect information assumption in the next
sections and compare with this benchmark case.
2.2.1 Non-deceptive Counterfeits: a Benchmark
For any quality level sa(a = H,L) that the authentic producer chooses, she is the leader and sets
her price ﬁrst, taking into account that the counterfeiter will set his price according to hers. Note
that the consumer who is completely indiﬀerent between purchasing the authentic and counterfeit
product has a valuation: V sa−Pa = V ms−Pc, which implies V = Pa−Pc
sa−ms. Similarly, the consumer
who is indiﬀerent between purchasing counterfeits and purchasing nothing has the valuation of Pc
ms.
It then follows that the players’ proﬁt functions are:
ΠD






7It is easy to derive that, given any brand price Pa, the proﬁt-maximizing price for the counterfeit
is Pc = msPa
2sa . The brand therefore sets her price by maximizing
ΠD





















To determine which quality level to pick in the ﬁrst place, the brand compares the maxi-
mum proﬁts attainable with optimized prices under each quality level (high or low), and chooses
the quality that yields a larger proﬁt among the two options. Proposition 1 gives the condition
under which the brand would choose the lower quality in the monopoly setting, and the following
proposition suggests conditions under which she would choose the higher quality when faced with
competition.







Brand upgrades quality in the hope of alleviating competition by widening the quality gap, provided
that the additional costs are not too high. It is easily veriﬁed using the derived equilibrium prices
that should the authentic ﬁrm produce the same quality as without counterfeits, its price will drop
with competition, similar to predictions from prior entry models with exogenously given quality
(eg. Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). However, this study more importantly pinpoints the previously
unexplored interplay of quality and price dynamics when both can be endogenously chosen by the
brand, as in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under the conditions speciﬁed in Lemmas 1 and 2, the brand upgrades quality in
the face of counterfeiting. Her price rises if the counterfeit quality sc is below a certain cutoﬀ value,
which is an increasing function of M and s.
It is worth noting the conditions on the incremental cost of introducing the higher quality
(including R&D costs and production costs) in order to have the innovation and price raise. The
cost has to be large enough to dissuade the brand from investing in higher quality as a monopoly
8(Lemma 1), yet still be surmountable (Lemma 2) so that she is willing to produce the higher quality
when faced with counterfeits’ competition.
The theoretical result that the threshold value for the entry quality is increasing in M and s
is again very intuitive. In particular, higher Ms implies larger gap between the counterfeit quality
and the high authentic quality. It therefore allows for a wider range of counterfeit product quality
where the brand ﬁnds it proﬁtable to raise price.
The key propositions hold with wider parameter ranges in the variant case where consumers
signal their social status through a low-cost counterfeit purchase, as in the next subsection.
2.2.2 When Buyers Fool Others through Counterfeit Status Signaling
Section 2.2 analyzes a typical market where some consumers are conned into buying counterfeits.
Another type of market exists in practice where consumers often knowingly purchase counterfeits
to signal their status to friends at a low cost. For instance, the fact that the fake Coach bags,
Chanel perfume, and Nike shoes sold for a small fraction of the cost of the legitimate products in
street corners are quite evident to the consumers that they are not authentic products to begin
with. Counterfeits serve to unbundle the prestige and quality attributes of branded products
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1988). In this case, the asymmetric information lies between the purchaser
of counterfeits and other consumers instead of between the counterfeiter and the buyer. In this
section, I analyze the implications of this layer of asymmetric information.
I model this asymmetric information by recognizing the key feature of counterfeits that
allows buyers to enjoy an imperfect fraction of the brand premium without having to pay for the
authentic quality. So the consumer utility derived from purchasing one unit of the authentic product
is Ua = V ∗sa +r −pa, and from purchasing one unit of the counterfeit is Uc = V ∗sc +λ∗r −pc,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. If the buyer of the counterfeit cannot be discerned by others as wearing a
counterfeit, then s/he acquire the full status signaling (λ = 1).
In a market without counterfeits, the consumer who is just indiﬀerent between purchasing
the authentic product and nothing has a valuation of V = Pa−r
sa . The equilibrium price and
quantities can be derived by maximizing proﬁts ΠM










(sa + r − ca)2
4sa
DM
a = 1 −
sa + ca − r
2sa
.
Proposition 2 Without counterfeits, authentic producer with brand premium r oﬀers product with
















Ms − r). Q.E.D.
The intuition is similar to those explained in Section 2.1. Moreover, we could rearrange the terms in
the condition to obtain r ≥
√
Ms− c √
M−1. The proposition is equivalent to stating that authentic
monopoly will oﬀer a lower quality iﬀ its brand premium is high enough. This suggests that brand
premium and quality can be considered substitutes to some extent. When the brand premium is
very high, then the authentic producer has less incentive to develop a high quality product without
competition in the market.
With counterfeits in the market, the consumer who is just indiﬀerent between purchasing a
counterfeit and an authentic product has valuation V =
Pa−Pc−(1−λ)r
sa−ms , and the consumer who is
indiﬀerent between counterfeit and nothing has valuation Pc−λ∗r
ms . Following the same derivation as
in Section 2.2.1, the equilibrium conditions in the game is:
Pa =



























(4M2 − 7Mm + 2m2 + M2λ)r





Again, competition from counterfeits could stimulate authentic innovation if the higher quality
Ms yields a higher proﬁt than the regular quality s. Propositions 2 and 3 can be rederived here
with new threshold values for c and sc.
10Proposition 3 When consumers of counterfeits could derive utility from the infringed brand status,
authentic producer has incentive to upgrade quality iﬀ the innovation cost is below a threshold level,
and the authentic price will increase iﬀ the counterfeit quality sc < ¯ sc where the threshold value of
¯ sc is increasing in s,λ.
Proof: First, solve ΠD
Ms > ΠD
s . Substituting in the duopoly equilibrium proﬁts and rearrange
terms, we have 2M−m



















Ruling out the negative root, the authentic proﬁt derived from the high quality product exceeds






In addition, price of the authentic high-quality product would increase as compared to




2 . This implies
2M ∗ sa − 2M ∗ sc + (cMs − cs)(2M − m) > 2sa − sc + M(2 − λ)r, where sa = Ms, cMs − cs = c.
This condition is satisiﬁed iﬀ sc <
2(M−1)sa+(2M−m)c−M(2−λ)r




and ∂ ¯ sc
∂λ = Mr
2M−1 > 0. Q.E.D.
The intuitions remain similar that quality and price increases if the cost of innovation is not too
high and the counterfeit quality is low as compared to the innovated quality. In addition, the more
status signaling a consumer are able to fake from utilizing the counterfeit, the more urgency that
authentic company has to self-diﬀerentiate through quality and price. The detailed proofs are in
the Appendix.
One special case of the model is interesting to consider. Some customers may attach zero
status signaling on the counterfeits, i.e. λ = 0. These customers can be considered the “moral
experts”, as they have no intention to fool their friends and other consumers. From the equilibrium
conditions derived above, the equilibrium prices will be lower and demand for authentic products
will be higher when consumers are “moral experts”. The equilibrium demand for counterfeits is
lower in this scenario too.
112.2.3 Deceptive Counterfeits: When Counterfeiters Fool Buyers
Asymmetric information is important in the context of counterfeiting, as many articles and news
stories reveal how consumers are conned into buying counterfeits.3 I assume that there is a fraction,
γ, of consumers who can distinguish between authentic qualities s and Ms, but may not be able
to tell counterfeits from their authentic counterparts at the same price, at least not until after the
purchase. This setup is not unfounded. In particular, authentic producers tend to provide detailed
information about their products in order to build reputation and brand recognition. Notably,
brands list product attributes and materials in their product catalogs. They also have “customer
service hot-lines” to address questions. Counterfeiters, on the other hand, mostly try to mimic the
appearance of authentic products and misrepresent attributes to extract short-term windfalls.
“Price is unquestionably one of the most important marketplace cues”(Lichtenstein et al.,
1993). The model here allows these confused consumers to infer quality information when diﬀerent
prices are charged. This fraction, γ, of consumers hold a prior belief on the probability a good
is authentic or counterfeit:  (θa) = b and  (θc) = 1 − b. These consumers (henceforth called
novices) are drawn uniformly from all the consumers in the taste V distribution.4 They update
their beliefs about seller’s type after observing prices. Let  (φi|p) = 1 denote consumers’ updated
posterior beliefs about seller i’s type being exactly φ = φi. The other 1 − γ fraction of consumers
are experts in the product (henceforth called experts) and know exactly the quality of the product
they are purchasing. They may purchase counterfeits at a lower price depending on their individual
willingness to trade oﬀ quality for price (similar to the case with complete information).
I handle the technical issue of out-of-equilibrium beliefs using an existing reﬁnement (eg.
Simester 1995, Feltovich et al 2001, Harbaugh and To 2008). In particular, I apply the popular
Divinity Criterion (D1) (Banks and Sobel, 1987), which is a variant to the intuitive criterion (Cho
and Kreps, 1987) to reﬁne the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Suppose that the counterfeiter type
beneﬁts from deviations under a set of best responses associated with possible out-of-equilibrium
3Chinese media reported a few years ago that a lady bought a pair of Nike shoes on sale, but only one
month later, they fell apart. Her happiness in catching the sale turned into indignation, and she sued the
NIKE branch in Shanghai. She then found out that the pair she got was a counterfeit version.
4Relaxing this assumption and drawing them more heavily from the low valuation consumers would not
qualitatively change the results.
12beliefs. D1 then requires that the consumer does not believe that the deviating type is an authentic
producer. More generally, suppose that in deviation p  = P∗, the counterfeiter is more likely to
yield higher proﬁt than in equilibrium under a bigger set of best responses from the consumer than
an authentic product does. D1 then requires that the consumer does not believe that the product
could be authentic. I detail the D1 criterion and its applications in this setting (both separating
and pooling equilibria) in Appendix A.3.
The counterfeiter ideally wants to pretend that its products are authentic and to charge
the same authentic price so as to split the original monopoly proﬁt. However, he soon realizes
that the expert consumers will not buy the counterfeits at the same price as the authentic price.
Under such pricing strategies, the perception of the novices on the quality of any product will drop:
spe = bsa+(1−b)sc < sa, and they will decide whether to purchase any product based on the utility
function of this expected quality. The counterfeiter reconsiders his pricing strategy accordingly,









If the counterfeiter chooses to separate with a diﬀerent price from the authentic price, then
all consumers can tell the products apart based on the model setup, and the resulting prices and
proﬁts can be easily solved as in Section 2.1. In particular, the reaction function is Pc = msPa
2sa =
mPa
2M , where M ≥ 1 encapsulates any authentic producer’s movements along the quality ladder:
equal to or above s. The counterfeiter prefers a separating equilibrium iﬀ Πse
c ≥ Π
pe
c . With the
above reaction function, this inequality implies that
Pa ≥
2γ(M − m)M(m − bm + bM)s
m2 − bm2 + bmM + 2Mγ(M − m)
≡ P (2)
where P is then a cutoﬀ value of the authentic price, above which the counterfeiter prefers to sepa-
rate and below which the counterfeiter prefers to pool with the authentic producer. I assume that
at the cutoﬀ value, the counterfeiter chooses to separate (reveal as generics) for fear of the potential
legal consequences of cheating. I will explicitly model such legal consequences and enforcement in
Section 2.3.2.
Bearing in mind the counterfeiter’s strategy, the authentic producer attempts to maximize
13her proﬁts subject to condition (1), when setting her price as a leader. Mathematically, she solves:
max Πse




s.t. P ≥ P
max Π
pe
a = (1 − γ)(P − ca)(1 − P
Ms) +
γ
2(P − ca)(1 − P
bMs+(1−b)ms)
s.t. P < P
and decides whether to set Pse
a , P, or P
pe
a depending on which would yield the largest proﬁts,
Πse
a , ¯ Πse
a , or Π
pe
a , respectively. In particular, I denote the constrained separating proﬁts (proﬁts
obtained at P) as ¯ Πse
a . I assume that whenever proﬁts are equivalent, the authentic producer
chooses to separate from the counterfeits. Several results follow from here, with detailed proofs in
the Appendix.
Lemma 3 The brand may raise price (above the monopoly price level associated with a given
quality) after counterfeiter’s entry to distinguish herself from the counterfeiter who has no incentive
to pool with such a high price level. This is the price signaling eﬀect.
Theoretically, this signaling eﬀect occurs when the optimal authentic price is the corner solution
at the constrained equilibrium. Intuitively, charging higher price is a viable separating strategy for
the brand largely due to the presence of the experts, who will purchase counterfeits only at a low
price. Therefore, at a suﬃciently high price, a counterfeiter does not have enough incentive to pool
with the brand. Given a suﬃciently large proportion of novices (γ) and suﬃcient quality gap (m), it
is worthwhile for the brand to price higher in order to signal her quality. The beneﬁts of capturing
the “novices” outweigh the costs of losing some low valuation consumers who may not purchase at
the constrained high price. Such signaling eﬀect could prevail with or without authentic quality
change, in theory, as long as it is the solution for the constrained optimization.
After working out the equilibrium prices for the same quality of the brand, it is natural to
consider how the conditions diﬀer if authentic quality changes due to counterfeiting. The alternative
quality strategies can be best divided into two cases, both starting from quality s: 1. “striving
for the better”: she improves quality to Ms; 2. “racing to the bottom”: she degradates quality
to ms. For each case, I derive the pooling and separating equilibria in the appendices. For
notational convenience, I also denote the strategy with no quality change as Strategy 3. With
a few supplemental lemmas and proofs as detailed in the appendices, I arrive at the following
result:
14Proposition 4 Counterfeiting can induce the brand price to rise under a wide range of parameter
values: First, the brand charges a higher price on the upgraded quality if the counterfeit quality sc
is below a certain cutoﬀ value, which is an increasing function of M and s. Second, even if the
brand retains the quality, she may charge a high price to signal superior quality and to distinguish
herself from the counterfeiter.
The ﬁnding here that asymmetric information enlarges the parameter range for price increases
helps to explain why we observe authentic prices hike more often in response to counterfeit entry
than to entry by other branded or generic producers. The manager of Pﬁzer in the Shanghai oﬃce
commented that once counterfeits are gone as a result of the government’s strengthened enforcement
(“yan da”), they would have to lower prices because consumers would no longer be willing to pay
extra for the brand authenticity.
When extending the model to monopolist competition with multiple brands, the intuition
is very similar to the benchmark model here. Relevant competition occurs mainly among ﬁrms
that are adjacent in the quality hierarchy, and counterfeit entry aﬀects the infringed brands most
(Appendix A.5.3). Key predictions hold when extending the model to a brand with multiple
products (Qian 2011).
2.3 Brand Protection Strategies
The previous section suggests quality diﬀerentiation and price signaling as strategies against coun-
terfeits. In this section, I further explore a set of brand-protection strategies. The analyses shed
lights on a plethora of strategic decision variables and enrich the competition model under exami-
nation. It further complements the Endogenous Sunk Costs (ESC) literature. ESC are ﬁxed costs
that ﬁrms can choose to invest in, which aﬀect the price-cost margin of a ﬁrm. Sutton (1991)
argues that the incentive for ﬁrms to invest in ESC increases as the market expands, and thereby
limiting the number of ﬁrms that can proﬁtably remain in the market. I examine and propose the
set of ESC in the context of counterfeiting.



























Figure 1: Comparative Statistic of ¯ γ and M.
2.3.1 Further Implications of Quality
Besides quality diﬀerentiation, the model here illuminates another strategic function of quality
upgrades in the face of counterfeiting. From the threshold value of the fraction of expert consumers
to ensure separating equilibrium, ¯ γ, that satisﬁes the binding condition in formula (1), I plot the
comparative static of ¯ γ as the authentic quality improvements M increases (
∂¯ γ
∂M) in Figure 1, given
a set of other parameter values. Here, the set of ceteras parabis values are: c = 0.5,m = 0.5,b =
0.5,s = 1. The negative relationship between ¯ γ and M holds under alternative speciﬁcations of
parameter values as long as the ¯ γ values are kept at the meaningful positive range.
Intuitively, the higher the authentic quality is as compared to the counterfeit, the lower
is the upper bound for the fraction of novices to induce a separating equilibrium in prices. In
other words, consumer expertise in detecting counterfeits and authentic quality improvements, M,
are substitutes. ¯ γMs < ¯ γs. When the authentic producer adopts a higher quality, notably better
materials (e.g. crocodile skins instead of cow skins), to produce its shoes, it naturally charges a
higher price that counterfeiters would not pool with. In sum, this drop in ¯ γ indicates that the
authentic producer, by increasing its own quality, is less aﬀected by counterfeits in two dimensions:
ﬁrst, she faces less competition from counterfeits with a more diﬀerent product, and second, the
widened quality gap helps to disentangle information friction so that counterfeits can fool fewer
consumers.
As we see in Section 2.2.2 and the Appendix, the drop in ¯ γ is also important for providing
incentives for the counterfeiter to choose a separating equilibrium price, because he would enjoy a
16diminished fraction of consumers in the pooling equilibrium and may be better oﬀ charging a lower
price to increase market share. In this scenario, the brand is more likely to provide a higher quality
product when counterfeiter enters.
2.3.2 Enforcement
Enforcement activities against counterfeits (either publicly lobbying or privately funding spot-
checks) are taken by many authentic companies. Notably, luxury house LVMH assigned approxi-
mately 60 full-time employees on anti-counterfeiting, in collaboration with a wide network of outside
investigators and a team of lawyers, and spent more than $16 million on investigations and legal
fees in 2004 alone. In the Chinese shoe market, authentic ﬁrms send their own employees to walk
around the market as consumers and track down counterfeiters. They then report the discoveries
to the local government, the Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau (QTSB) in particular,
and have them close down these counterfeit sources and outlaw illegal companies. Intuitively, these
enforcement investments increase the odds that counterfeits will be conﬁscated and major coun-
terfeiters will be jailed. Most times, successful enforcement cases are announced in newspapers to
caution consumers and to deter future counterfeits. The risk of such penalties reduces incentives
for counterfeiting and favors the separating equilibrium. The eﬀects of enforcement on counterfeit
deterrences and on authentic prices are examined here.
To weave the above intuition into my model, suppose that with probability w(e), which is
an increasing function of e, counterfeiters are ﬁned −
γΠpe
2 . Note that branded companies that have
better relationship with the government have a higher w given the same investment e. Now the IC
constraint for the counterfeiter IC(1) : Πse












For w ∈ (0,1], Pe < P, so this is a looser condition for a separating equilibrium – the counterfeiter
has less incentive to pool than to reveal as a low-quality producer. In addition, as the winning
probability w increases, Pe drops, favoring the separating equilibrium.
The separating equilibrium incentive constraint also relaxes for the authentic producer, and
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17Deﬁne the authentic proﬁt with enforcement investments Πe
a = wΠse + (1 − w)Πpe − e, then we
notice that it is no higher than the optimal separating equilibrium proﬁt, if attainable, without
enforcement investments. If, however, the natural separating equilibrium is not attainable (be-
cause optimal separating equilibrium price is lower than P), then the enforcement activities can
be proﬁtable if Πe
a ≥ Π
pe
a . i.e., e ≤ w(Πse
a − Π
pe
a ). Together with the condition that Pe
a ≥ Pe,
the authentic producer has incentives to invest in enforcement. In addition, we see in the previous
section that separating equilibrium proﬁt exceeds pooling equilibrium proﬁt more when there are a
larger fraction of novices in the market. It then follows from the inequality conditions here that the
incentive to invest in self-enforcement increases as information asymmetry worsens. We therefore
have
Proposition 5 Enforcement activities add risks and costs to counterfeiters, thereby favoring a
separating equilibrium. The brand would upgrade quality iﬀ the conditions for the R&D costs and
counterfeit quality are fulﬁlled as in Proposition 2.
An article in the Wall Street Journal reports another real-world example on self-enforcement.
Luxury-goods companies like LVMH lobbied governments to announce it illegal not only to man-
ufacture and sell counterfeits, but also to participate in leasing, shipping, and any other part of
the supply chain that leads to the sale of counterfeit wares (Galloni, 2006). In my interviews and
ﬁeld studies in China, a few brands shared stories on how their tight connection with the govern-
ment helps deterring counterfeits. For instance, the brands that get faster government responses
in tracking down their counterfeits experienced less counterfeiting.
2.3.3 Non-price Signals
While price is a typical signal of quality and authenticity, as derived in Section 2.2.2, are
there additional signaling devices besides price? These devices could be forms of either ﬁxed-cost
investment, such as licensed company stores where authentic producer display exclusive licenses
obtained from the Bureau of Industrial Commerce (Qian, 2008), or marginal-cost investment, such
as costly holograms and packaging (Wall Street Journal, 2006).
Intuitively, these signaling devices help to establish a separating equilibrium where the
authentic products can be distinguished from the counterfeits. I denote the ﬁxed-cost signals (eg.
18company stores) l, and marginal cost signals (eg. holograms) T. I redeﬁne the strategy space
σi = (Pi,li,Ti),i = a,c.
The IC constraints for a separating equilibrium now become:
IC(c) : Πc(σc,σa) ≥ max[Πc(σa,σa),0]
IC(a) : Πa(σa,σc) ≥ max[Πa(σc,σc),0], subject to IC(c)







2(P − T)(1 − P
bMs+(1−b)ms)
Pa ≥
2(M − m)M(b(M − m) + m)sγ




As T increases, PT drops, and IC(c) becomes a looser condition to satisfy (it is easier for Pa to fall
in the range where the counterfeiter prefers to separate).







bMs+(1−b)ms). If we deﬁne
ga = l + T(1 −
(2M−m)P
2M(M−m)s), then IC(a) becomes: (P − ca)(1 −
(2M−m)P
2M(M−m)s) − ga ≥ Π
pe
a .
The brand prefers separating equilibrium iﬀ ga ≤ Πse
a (σa,σc) − Π
pe
a . Such (T,l) pairs are easily
attainable, and authentic prices rise in the separating equilibrium. Therefore,
Proposition 6 Non-price signals relax the conditions for separating equilibrium. ∂∆P
∂T > 0. These
signaling devices take on more important roles when they provide actual information about authen-
ticity.
The role of vertical integration of downward retail stores are best explained in managers’ own
words. During my interviews with some Chinese branded companies who suﬀered from counterfeit-
ing, one manager said, “Starting from 1996, our company products have reduced using the wholesale
market and we switched the channel to licensed retailing. We established a well-managed retail
distribution system nationwide. This is one of the most eﬀective ways to combat counterfeits, and
it almost deterred counterfeiting. These guys have little incentive to mimic our strategy, because
having company stores will only reveal themselves to be easily detected and tracked down.” An-
other sales manager told me, “Counterfeits pushed us to establish our [licensed] stores. We have
now discovered a new channel [of retailing] and we are now trying to build our personality into
it.” One brand protection oﬃcer stated that, “Once our licensed company stores were opened, we
had an inﬂux of customers come and purchase even at much higher prices than the old wholesale
19prices. Why? We later learned that many customers who bought counterfeit shoes felt very uncom-
fortable due to the inferior shoe materials, and some [counterfeits] even fell apart in public, which
caused embarrassment. These customers undoubtedly would rather pay more to secure authentic
purchases. In the end, we had higher mark-ups for our shoes and more resources to develop new
models of higher quality, which certainly would charge further higher prices and bring in more
proﬁts. As the gap between our products and the counterfeits widens, customers like ours more.
We call this a virtuous cycle.”
2.4 Welfare Analyses
In the monopolistic market without counterfeits, the total demand DM
a = 1 − sa+ca
2sa and con-




(V s − sa+ca
2 )f(V )dV =
(sa−ca)2
8sa . Social welfare is the sum of consumer










32M2(M−m)s > CSM. Competition increases consumer sur-
plus because the counterfeits capture the low-valuation consumers who could not have aﬀorded the
authentic products. In addition, consumers derive more utility from the possible quality upgrade
of the brand. It is worth noting from the simulation plot Fig. 2a that consumer surplus is high
when the counterfeit quality is close to the authentic quality (m ≈ 1 and M ≈ 1) because perfect
competition drives price down to the marginal cost level, and consumers enjoy equal quality at a
much lower price than in the monopoly case. When authentic quality improves marginally in the
neighborhood of s (M slightly exceed 1), consumer surplus actually drops. Only when the authentic
quality upgrades to a signiﬁcantly higher level (M > 1.5 in the ﬁgure) will the gain in consumer
surplus pick back up; The higher the product qualities (larger M and m), the more welfare gain
there is in the competitive market (Fig.2a). In these simulations, I normalize quality s to be unit
1 and cost c to be a half.
The brand’s proﬁt changes in the market with counterfeits as compared to the one without:
δΠa = ΠD
a − ΠM
a . Figure 2b shows that authentic producer surplus is a decreasing function in
m. That is, the more the counterfeiter could knockoﬀ the authentic quality, the lower the brand’s
proﬁt. In the extreme case of perfect knockoﬀ, both ﬁrms price at zero and earns zero proﬁt in
20the equilibrium. As also shown in the ﬁgure, minor increases in quality (M slightly exceed 1) only
worsen proﬁts when counterfeit quality is very high (m ≈ 1), because it is not suﬃcient to alleviate
competition while incurring additional cost. Outside this particular range of M and m, authentic
innovation leads to more authentic proﬁts.
The counterfeiter’s surplus is highest when it can very closely replicate the authentic quality
s (eg. m = 1, M = 1.1), as it can then split the market almost evenly with the brand (Fig. 2c).
As counterfeit quality decreases, its proﬁt decreases by stealing less share from the brand. Coun-
terfeiter proﬁt also declines as the brand upgrades quality (M increases), although the marginal
beneﬁts of further quality upgrade are low when the quality gap between the counterfeit and au-
thentic products is already wide. Notably, when the counterfeit quality is very low (eg. m = 0.1 in
Fig 2c), counterfeit proﬁt is not sensitive to the change in M. On the other hand, when counterfeit
completely knocks oﬀ the original product quality (m = 1), then brand’s innovation (M > 1) can
drastically drive down counterfeiter’s proﬁtability, although not likely to completely drive it out of
the market. This again conﬁrms Propositions 1 and 2 that innovation can be a viable strategy.
In calculating the social welfare, I used the traditional deﬁnition of including consumer
surplus and all producer surpluses. The comparative statics resemble those discussed for the con-
sumer surplus, as Figure 2d displays. Social welfare simulations without summing the counterfeiter
surplus result in similar (only more sharpened) comparative statics.
The unconstrained separating equilibrium in a market with deceptive counterfeits resem-
bles the benchmark case. Consumers beneﬁt from the increased product variety as well as lowered
brand price in the separating equilibrium.
However, in the constrained separating equilibrium, demand and consumer surplus change
to:
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Fig 2d. Change in Social Welfare
Figure 2: Welfare Simulations under Complete Information.







a = 1 − A
CSse =
s(M−(M−m)A2−mB2)
2 − ¯ Πse





CSse > CSM only for small m(m ≤ 4
7) and γ mainly because counterfeits impose two opposing
eﬀects on consumer surplus in the constrained separating equilibrium. On the one hand, when the
brand separates herself from the counterfeiter, similar welfare improvement could occur as in the
benchmark case without deception. On the other hand, counterfeiting would lead to distortions in
authentic price (high price for signaling), where price is artiﬁcially high to satisfy the IC constraints.
Suﬃciently low counterfeit quality and suﬃciently small fraction of uninformed consumers ensure
22the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates.
When non-price signals and enforcement investments were applied to attain a separating
equilibrium, the social welfare becomes SWse =
s(M−(M−m)A2−mB2)
2 − e −l − T ∗ (1 − A). Figures
3a plots the social welfare of the constrained separating equilibrium as functions of the extents
of authentic innovation (M) and asymmetric information (γ). In general, social welfare increases
when authentic upgrades quality more (M increases) and when the fraction of confused consumers
in the market (the fraction of novice consumers in the market γ) is less. Figures 3b plots the
social welfare as functions of the extent of asymmetric information (γ) and the non-price signal
investment (t). Social welfare is a decreasing function of γ. When there are a lot of novices in
the market (γ close to 1), brand’s investment in non-price signals and self-enforcement alike helps
to alleviate asymmetric information and improve social welfare. When there is little asymmetric
information (γ close to 0), these investments are wasteful and decrease social welfare, as Figure 3b
demonstrates.
Figures 3c and 3d graph how social welfare of the constrained separating equilibrium changes
with respect to counterfeiter’s quality as a fraction of original monopoly quality (m) and market
asymmetric information (γ) when the brand doesn’t (M = 1) or does (M > 1) innovate in response,
respectively. As shown in Figure 3c, social welfare improves as m increases when there is little
asymmetric information (γ close to zero). In the extreme where counterfeiter could perfectly
knockoﬀ authentic quality s (m = 1), then it does not matter how many confused consumers there
are in the market, as any product would have the same quality s. When counterfeit quality is low,
then welfare drops as the proportion of novices increases. When nobody in the market could tell
counterfeits and authentic products apart at the same price, intermediate level of m is worst for
social welfare because it forces up price to attain the constrained separating equilibrium without
oﬀering high quality to compensate for the loss in consumer surplus. Figure 3d conveys very
similar intuition to Fig. 3c. A minor diﬀerence is that asymmetric information uniformly hurts
social welfare here with authentic innovation, since counterfeits are always inferior to the upgraded
authentic quality. Comparing Figures 3c and 3d, authentic innovation lifts up the social welfare

































Fig.3b. Social Welfare of Constrained Equilibrium wrt t
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Fig.3d. Social Welfare of Constrained Equilibrium, M>1
Figure 3: Welfare Simulations Under Asymmetric Information.
2.5 Discussion of the Model
The model proposed here provides a simple theoretical framework to analyze brand’s responses
to a new entrant. The framework encapsulates a few special cases as summarized in the chart
below. In particular, some counterfeits involve no asymmetric information to either the user or
user’s friends (γ = 0,λ = r = 0, as in Section 2.2.1). A typical example is pirated movie disc
that is usually sold at less than a dollar in Asian countries, where one generally does not associate
any status signaling with any of these CDs. The more common counterfeits generate two layers
of asymmetric information, as captured by the general model. Based on interviews with retailers
in China, some counterfeiters fake themselves as promotion agents and oﬀer stores deep discounts
of branded products. The counterfeit products that are mixed into these regular channels has the
24Complete Info. Asymmetric Info.
Counterfeits γ = 0,λ = r = 0 γ > 0 Eg. Regular store
fake shoes
Eg. Pirated movie disc γ = 0,λ > 0 Eg. Canal
St. products
Imitation and γ = 0,λ = 0 γ > 0,λ = 0,e = 0
Generic products Legal, no lawsuit e = 0 Eg. a new service with
Eg. CVS Cookies unknown quality
potential to deceive buyers. In other cases, counterfeits are sold in suspicious locations such as
the Canal Street in NYC. All buyers know exactly what they are getting by going there, and they
intend to fool others into thinking that they own branded products.
In addition, entry of some generic products can be considered as special cases of the model,
where certain parameter values reduce to zero. The key diﬀerence between counterfeiting and
imitation is that the former has the intent to deceive. As the second block of the chart summarizes,
most imitative or generic entry incurs no law suit. Some may still generate asymmetric information
to the extent that the buyers may be uncertain of its quality (high or low). The model provides
detailed parameter ranges for various predictions as detailed in previous sections, and one could
easily apply the derived results to these special cases with the appropriate paramter values.
While this model covers many aspects of counterfeits and imitation, it leaves out many others.
For example, my model does not cover potential network eﬀects that consumer utility may increase
as the number of user base increases. Such network eﬀects are quite unique to the software in-
dustry and are modeled by Conner and Rumelt (1991). On the status signaling side, this model
also addresses only a key aspect of how counterfeits could enable consumers to disbundle quality
and brand premium and how such asymmetric information could aﬀect authentic producer’s price
and quality choices. Other aspects, such as the optimal demand for status goods, are out of the
scope of this paper and are related to the vast fashion literature (Pesendorfer, 1995). Interest-
ingly, a most recent study on fashion (Raustiala and Spigman, 2006) concluded that “Not only
has the lack of copyright protection for fashion designs not destroyed the incentive to innovate in
apparel, it may have actually promoted it”(p92), based on detailed historical and industry analyses.
253 Empirical Validation
3.1 Data and Identiﬁcation Strategy
I test the theory predications using a natural experiment in the Chinese shoe industry, aris-
ing from an exogenous shift in government enforcement eﬀorts away from monitoring footwear
trademarks. The Chinese copyright and trademark laws were restored after 1976. Since 1985,
the Chinese government has established the Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau (QTSB),
with a branch in each city and joint forces nation-wide, to supervise product qualities and outlaw
counterfeit localities. The Bureau has enlarged its personnel and funding since 1991 in joint eﬀorts
with legislations to protect IPR and to monitor product quality. Due to a series of accidents aris-
ing from low quality or counterfeit agricultural products, gas tanks, food, drugs, and alcohol, the
Chinese government issued notiﬁcations in late 1994 (Notiﬁcation No.52) and early 1996 (Notiﬁca-
tion No.10) to enhance quality supervision and combat counterfeits in seven main sectors prone to
hazardous materials. The majority of the Bureau workforce and funding went into these sectors,
lessening enforcement in the footwear industry. In the early 1990s, approximately 12% of the Bu-
reau’s resources were devoted to the footwear sector (5% to leather shoes). This number, however,
fell to 2% after 1995 (QTSB yearbooks). Data provided by the authentic companies reveal that
they experienced signiﬁcant counterfeit entry after this loosening of governmental monitoring and
enforcement: most entry occurred in 1996. This exogenous policy shock provides a natural experi-
ment to study the eﬀects of counterfeit entry in the Chinese shoe industry.
Furthermore, this policy change increased the likelihood of entry by counterfeiters to au-
thentic companies that have poor relationships with the local government than it did to authentic
companies with strong ties to the government. This ﬁnding was revealed in both qualitative inter-
views with managers and data analyses, as detailed in Section 3.2. The importance of relationship
is not conﬁned to China. In an Imaging Supplies Coalition Anti-Counterfeiting conference in 2008,
Andrew Gardner from Lexmark International gave a case study on actual “sting” operations to
bust a counterfeiting ring in developing countries. It articulated how close collaboration between
multiple vendors and the local government was crucial to successfully executing this operation. I
26therefore use the interaction between the policy change and the diﬀerential relationships between
each branded company and the government to identify the entry eﬀects by counterfeiters for dif-
ferent brands, as detailed in the next subsection.
The data I gather consist of detailed information taken from companies’ annual ﬁnancial
statements and other relevant company records on a random sample of 31 branded companies from
the census of Chinese shoe ﬁrms and the brands’ corresponding counterfeits for the years 1993-
2004. The data here include the average prices and costs of two product-quality levels (high and
low, mapping to Ms and s in the theoretical model) for each authentic brand and the corresponding
counterfeits, the number of personnel and amount of expenditure used for trademark enforcement,
advertisement expenditure, and the total number of licensed company stores. All these data are
taken from each company’s ﬁnancial statements. My dataset includes both domestic brands and
multinational brands operating in China, and is supplemented by the Chinese Industrial Census
database, product catalog information, and interviews. Data on counterfeit entry, prices, and costs
for each brand are obtained from each company’s “brand-protection” oﬃces and the government
(speciﬁcally, the Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau). Qian (2008) and Appendix B pro-
vide further data details.
In addition, I code and compile a dataset of the diﬀerent characteristics for each type of
shoes listed in the companies’ and stores’ annual catalogs. These data consist of the shoe material,
comfort level, decorative patterns, support and cushioning features, ventilation, etc. Recognizing
the importance of validating the data from ﬁrm reports, I run hedonic regressions of the unit pro-
duction costs, as provided by the sampled companies, on the corresponding material, machinery,
and other characteristics of the shoes, as recorded in the catalogs. I conduct the analyses on the
samples of leather shoes and sport shoes separately. These characteristics together account for 90%
of the cost variation. These results lend credibility to the company data.
I also conducted mall intercepts and street interviews with retailers (N=30) and consumers
(N=200) to learn about potential channels of counterfeits and consumer attitudes toward counter-
feits. Some retailers were fooled by the counterfeiters who claimed to be sales force of branded
company and who oﬀered huge discounts to fulﬁll their year-end sales quota. A majority of the
consumers at the mall claim that they cannot tell counterfeits apart, and they usually rely on price
27or store signals to infer quality and authenticity of the product. However, in the interviews with
consumers who frequent street corner merchants, the consumers unanimously told me that they
like these boutiques for the cheap prices and that they don’t expect real branded products.
3.2 IV Validity
The branded companies that were infringed upon set up their own “brand-protection” oﬃces to
make up for the lack of government monitoring of counterfeits. The company ﬁxed-eﬀects regression
of the log of company enforcement investment on a legislation dummy is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 5% level (coeﬃcient=3.2), implying an 20-fold increase in private enforcement investment to
compensate for the lack of public enforcement. However, the authentic companies still had to get
the government to outlaw the counterfeit sites once their own enforcement employees discovered
them. This is where relationships with the government (the QTSB in particular) come into play.
Before the enforcement change, the Quality and Technology Supervision Bureau conducted
regular inspections in the shoe markets and factories. They conﬁscated and shut down counterfeit
localities right on the spot. The monitoring mechanism was therefore quite uniform across diﬀerent
brands. After the enforcement change, however, companies that had a good relationship with the
government received more attention and faster responses when they reported counterfeit cases. All
else being equal, this would reduce the incentives of counterfeiters to infringe these brands. This
company-level variation is helpful in exploring the variation in the eﬀect of enforcement change on
counterfeit entry and sales for diﬀerent brands and, in turn, the eﬀect on diﬀerent authentic prices.
The challenge is to obtain a proxy for such a relationship.
Qian (2008) established that the ISO proxy is a plausibly exogenous measurement for such
relationship based on a synthesis of interview evidence and empirical analyses. Since the late 1980s,
all registered companies in China were required to meet the standards set by the International
Standards Organization (ISO)5. For the shoe industry, ISO sets standards for the basic equipment
a company uses and basic environment and labor treatments. The QTSB is in charge of the ISO
certiﬁcation. For some companies, one month was suﬃcient for obtaining the ISO certiﬁcate, but
5This diﬀers from the U.S. practice where companies adopt ISO voluntarily.
28for others, the application and grant dates were over 300 days apart. Among these companies
that spent a long time to fulﬁll the ISO requirements, some are small companies and some are
medium or large ones. I use the number of work days it took each company to pass the ISO 1994
requirements as a proxy for its relationship with the local government (or how fast it dealt with the
bureaucracy). There are more variations in this indicator across ﬁrms within the same local area
than variations across regions. There is also no signiﬁcant correlation between this relationship
proxy and the company’s market share, sales, product quality or production cost in my data. The
largest correlation amounts to only .08.
Because the enforcement change was due to a series of accidents which took place in other
industries, it is plausibly randomly assigned. The IV exclusion restrictions are also fulﬁlled because
tightened government enforcement elsewhere is not expected to aﬀect shoe prices directly. The
relationship proxy does not correlate with counterfeit entry directly in the ﬁrst step of IV regression.
The ﬁrst stage (Equation 2 below) regresses counterfeit dummy on the indicator variable (Loose)
for the loosened attention to the footwear industry, which takes on a value 1 for years 1995 onwards
and 0 otherwise, the interaction variable between the legislation change indicator and relationship
proxy, the relationship proxy, and year trend. I only included these most important instruments
because additional weaker instruments can reduce the eﬀectiveness of IV.
Counterfeita,t = α0 + α1 ∗ (Loose*Relationship)a,t + α2 ∗ Loosea,t + α3 ∗ Relationshipa,t + α4 ∗ t + ea,t (3)
This ﬁrst stage of IV estimation shows clearly that the instruments are highly correlated
with the endogenous variables: fake entry and fake sale quantities as a share of authentic sale
quantities (Table A2). As shown in Columns 2 and 4 in Table A2, the legislation dummy and
the interaction variable are highly correlated with the counterfeit entry or sales and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The overall Wald Chi-square test for the instruments are highly sig-
niﬁcant. The relationship proxy itself, however, does not carry statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
This means that a company’s relationship with the local government correlates with its counterfeit
entry only after the loosening of the governmental enforcement eﬀorts in the footwear sector. This
is exactly as we expected, giving evidence that this relationship proxy fulﬁlls both the relevance
and the exclusion restrictions.
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4.1 Stratiﬁcation Analyses for Pricing Responses
From the theoretical model in Section 2, the comparative statics are ∂P
∂s > 0; ∂P
∂c > 0; ∂P
∂m < 0 .
This guides my basic model:
log(Pa,t) = β0 + β1 ∗ Counterfeita,t−k + β2 ∗ log(ca,t) + β3 ∗ ma,t + βT
4 ∗ YearDt + βT
5 ∗ BrandDa + ǫa,t, (4)
where k stands for the number of lagged years for the entry of counterfeits to take full eﬀect on
the price outcome. Based on the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC), a model with a two-year lag (k = 2) was selected. ca,t is the unit materials cost
that also serves as a quality proxy for the corresponding authentic product in the current year t.
ma,t =
sc,t
sa,t is the quality (as proxied by unit cost) of the counterfeit product as a fraction of the
authentic counterpart. To address the potential endogeneity of couterfeit entry, I simultaneously
estimate Equations (3) and (4) using 2SLS.
Propositions 1 predicts that authentic price will rise post-entry if and only if the imita-
tor’s quality is below a threshold. I therefore stratify the authentic products into two subsamples
according to the threshold value and analyze them separately. I try to map this threshold value
(
2M((M−1)s+c)−mc
2M−1 ) empirically to the best approximation allowed by the data. Qualities are not
observed directly but approximated by the unit production (material) costs, and the additional
cost to upgrade quality is simply the unit cost diﬀerence between the high-quality and pre-entry
low-quality products. I calculate m as in Equation (4) and M as the ratio between the year t
product cost and the pre-entry product cost. I stratify the sampled brands according to whether
their counterfeit quality is less than the threshold at the entry year. I then estimate Equations (3)
and (4) on the panel data of each sample of brands.
Regression outputs for these two strata are reported in Table 1. Please note that the set
of brands that were not infringed in the sampled period are included in both strata to serve as
the control group. Columns 1 and 2 report results using high-end product prices as the outcome
variable and Columns 3 and 4 report those using low-end product prices as outcome. Both the stan-
30dard and clustered standard error regressions yield consistent empirical results with the theoretical
predictions: ˆ β1 > 0, ˆ β2 > 0, ˆ β3 < 0. Results show that the log cost for authentic products are strong
predictors for log prices in both samples. The improved quality (proxied by log of authentic cost)
explains most of the price change. The more competitive pressure counterfeit entry exerts, the less
authentic price rises. These results are highly consistent with the theoretical model predictions.
The counterfeit entry indicator bears statistically signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient in predict-
ing high-end authentic prices only for the subsample of products that are infringed by low-quality
counterfeits (Column 2 of Table 1), as predicted by Proposition 1. Since most counterfeit quality
is considerably inferior, the threshold condition is satisﬁed by majority of the sample. The part
of the price increase that remains signiﬁcant after controlling for the costs are consistent with two
hypotheses: First, segmentation of customers into purchasing high-end brand and low-end entrant
products could imply that the brand could reoptimize to a higher price for the high valuation
consumers (Frank and Salkevers 1997, 1999); Second, the brand charges a higher price to signal
quality so as to separate from the counterfeits. Both eﬀects are modeled in Section 2. However,
should segmentation of customers be the sole driver of the price increases, such increase would be
manifested mostly for the higher-end authentic products as these tailor to the higher-valuation con-
sumers. The fact that the net counterfeit eﬀect (controlling for cost) is also positive and signiﬁcant
for the low-end authentic price (Column 3 of Table 1) reveals at least some price signaling eﬀect in
action, as predicted by Proposition 2, although a more complete test among competing hypotheses
would require detailed consumer-level data that are not available here.
Results are qualitatively robust when splitting the sample in other ways. When I stratiﬁed
the sample with looser conditions on counterfeit quality (eg. quartile values, etc.), the results for
the subsamples of low-quality entrants remain qualitatively similar. The positive coeﬃcient on
the entry dummy takes on more signiﬁcances (economically and statistically) in the subsamples
of “high-quality” counterfeits when the deﬁnition of “high-quality entrant” becomes looser. The
inclusion of observations with lower-quality entrants naturally alters the average-eﬀect estimates.
314.2 Quality Diﬀerentiation
Propositions 1, 2, and 3 all predict innovations as a combating strategy with appropriate costs.
To gain a deeper understanding of the authentic quality responses, I gathered data on shoe charac-
teristics from the product catalogs. I ranked the quality in each observable or meaningful dimension
according to the cost of the materials used for that dimension.6 For the less quantiﬁable attributes,
I mainly used dummy indicators. I constructed the variable for shoe appearance by summing up
three dummy variables–ﬁne, elegant, and patterns–each taking on a value of 1 if a pair of shoes is
described in the catalog to possess the characteristic, and 0 otherwise. A simple sum is generated
instead of a weighted sum to avoid biasing results according to prior beliefs on which attributes
are the more important quality components. I then constructed a variable for functionality by
summing up the following indicator variables: versatility, cushioning (whether a pair of shoes has
cushioning eﬀects), absorption (whether it can absorb sweat), countering athlete’s foot, softness,
comfort, sturdiness, warmth, friction (for protection on slippery ground), and additional features
for sport shoes such as durability, ﬂexibility, and support.
I exhausted all the attributes that are mentioned in the product catalogs. I also constructed
a variable indicating the technology applied to make the shoes, embodied in the equipment. Before
counterfeit entry, all the companies used domestic equipment. However, after entry, many of them
imported Italian production lines, pattern-pressing machines, and equipment to make shoe bottoms
with cow skins. I ﬁrst constructed a dummy variable for each type of equipment, and then added
them up to generate the “equipment” variable. I generated the variable “workmanship” to indicate
whether the shoes were made with detailed and careful craftsmanship. Finally, I added up the
values of these diﬀerent-characteristic variables to obtain the overall quality proxy.
To examine the actual innovations after being infringed by counterfeits, I carried out re-
gressions for the continuous variable for overall quality on counterfeit entries of brands in the
leather-shoe sector (Panel A of Table 2) and sport-shoe sector (Panel B), following the same identi-
ﬁcation strategy and controlling for year- and company-ﬁxed eﬀects. I found statistically signiﬁcant
6For instance, the variable for surface material takes on a value of 1 if it is made of plastic leather,...,4
for regular cow skin,..., and 14 for crocodile skin, in ascending order of material costs. Similar procedures
are carried out to generate the variables for measuring the quality of the shoe side and bottom materials.
32coeﬃcients on the quality measures (log deﬂated production costs and the overall quality rank),
signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Tables 2). In particular, the coeﬃcients on counterfeit entry in the
regressions for overall quality ranks indicate that the overall authentic quality shifted up by 15 per-
centile points after the brand experienced counterfeits (the modes of the distributions for quality
ranks were approximately equal to 20). This set of empirical ﬁndings directly support the theory
predictions on innovations, and could be welfare enhancing under a wide parameter ranges as in
the simulation exercises.
4.3 Eﬀectiveness of Other Marketing Strategies
Propositions 3 and 4 predicts self-enforcement strategies as means of deterring counterfeiting.
In this setion, I explore the the stigma of counterfeits by regressing the counterfeit measure on a set
of variables as detailed in the variables’ column of Table 3. The results provide some evidence that
the strategies companies use to ﬁght counterfeits are quite eﬀective. In particular, an additional
licensed company store established in the previous year helps to reduce counterfeit sale quantities
as a fraction of authentic quantities by 2%, on average, statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Each store also helps to deter entry by 0.1% on average, although signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.
Lagged-year enforcement costs are also shown to be negatively correlated with counterfeit entry,
sale quantities, and log sales. An additional 10,000 yuan ($1,250) invested in enforcement reduces
counterfeit sales by 0.3% on average, which is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These results help to put
some ﬁgures to the predictions in Propositions 3 and 4.
The coeﬃcients on the other controls (Rows 5-8 in Table 3) give additional insights to
the questions “what attracts counterfeit entry? What suppresses counterfeit sales?” The positive
coeﬃcients on Gini, a traditional proxy for income inequality, are signiﬁcant at the 5% level for
predicting counterfeit entry and sales. This implies that higher income inequality may give rise to
more demand for counterfeits, possibly because there is a larger segment of consumers who would
like to own the luxury products but cannot aﬀord the authentic ones, and/or because status goods
play a more important role in a more unequal society. The lagged-year authentic sales are positively
correlated with counterfeit sales (Column 1 and 3 in Table 4). Although not statistically signiﬁcant,
the lagged-year authentic product cost is negatively associated with counterfeit sales (Column 3),
33indicating that products of higher quality may be less targeted by counterfeiters, possibly because
they are more costly to imitate and there is less asymmetric information available to deceive con-
sumers.
While the authentic companies try all measures to ﬁght counterfeits, are there variations
in the aggressiveness among companies? I test whether these ﬁrm strategies are complements or
substitutes of its relationship with the government. As reported in Table 4, I regress the mean levels
of advertisement and enforcement expenditures, number of licensed stores, and quality upgrading
costs (diﬀerence in the log unit production cost as compared to the previous year), respectively, on
the relationship proxy (ISO approval days, as explained in 3.2), controlling for year- and company-
ﬁxed eﬀects. All relevant nominal terms are deﬂated with CPI and transformed to log terms.
Companies with a worse relationship with the government are shown to have established more
licensed retail stores and spent more on quality improvements, statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
levels. The coeﬃcient on the ISO variable in the private enforcement expenditure regression is not
signiﬁcant, although positive. This may not be surprising if we recall that even the companies
with good relationships with government had to invest in monitoring markets after the government
reallocated enforcement resources in 1995. The diﬀerence is that they may work better with the
government to outlaw their discovered counterfeiting localities.
The fact that the infringed brands had to co-live with counterfeiters even after investing
handsomely in a plethora of self-enforcement strategies in the period of loosened public enforcement
speak to the necessity of government enforcement. In the years of strong government monitoring,
counterfeiters were afraid of entering the footwear market. Whereas after the natural policy change,
brands had to compensate for the lack of public enforcement. Their strategies were not suﬃcient
to fully deter counterfeit entry but only to the eﬀect of countering the infringement eﬀects, as in
the theoretical predictions of the constrained separating equilibrium. In this sense, private enforce-
ment seem less eﬀective than public enforcement and can be suboptimal from the social welfare
perspective.
345 Conclusion
Economic impacts of counterfeits are urgent concerns for business managers and policy makers.
The main contribution of this paper is to uncover such impacts and to propose marketing strategies
against counterfeits. I develop a vertical diﬀerentiation model for imitative and counterfeit entry
to predict and explain the pricing and marketing responses of authentic incumbents to new en-
try. By examining the equilibrium conditions and allowing the authentic producer to endogenously
determine quality and a set of other strategies besides prices, I am able to provide a more com-
plete picture of the (dis)incentive structures for counterfeiting and brand protection. This study
attempts to provide a tractable theoretical framework to unveil the entry eﬀects of counterfeits on
the various marketing norms.
My analyses show that the counterfeit entry may exert downward pressure on prices by
lowering expected quality in any short-run pooling equilibrum. More importantly, however, coun-
terfeit entry with low quality also induces the original producer to oﬀer a higher quality product
at a higher price. This suggests a successful business strategy to mitigate copycat competition:
innovation. The brand’s innovations and the newly-available counterfeits that tailor to the low-
valuation consumers could imply some positive welfare vibe in diversifying demand and increasing
consumer surplus. However, individual consumers who most prefer the baseline authentic quality
(s) at the monopoly price (p), if any of them exists, would be worse oﬀ if this quality level (s) is
replaced by a higher quality (Ms) at a higher price after counterfeits enter the market. In that
sense, counterfeiting may not be Pareto improving even if the overall social welfare increases. There
is no lack of market frictions generated by the asymmetric information between counterfeiters and
non-expert consumers. The analysis reveals that authentic producers may use a high price to signal
authenticity and deter counterfeits from pooling. In addition, an authentic company’s non-price
signaling devices push up costs or reinforce its local monopoly position, thereby help its products
to sustain a high price. Company-level enforcement activities and licensed stores are shown to
deter counterfeit entry or reduce counterfeit sales. Finally, for companies conducting business in
developing countries, it is worth noting that relationships with local governments play important
roles in brand management.
35Although starting from a simple model, the propositions has general implications for im-
itative or counterfeit entries. Honest imitative entry (e.g. generic drugs) is apparently analyzed
in the benchmark model. Imitations that are not honest about their quality generate asymmetric
information and their eﬀects are analyzed in the framework with asymmetric information. The
key model predictions are validated with a unique panel dataset on shoe counterfeits. The set of
analytical predications also help to explain a rich set of the empirical ﬁndings and many real-world
cases as explained in the main text.
This paper is a ﬁrst step in exploring the complex impacts of counterfeits and the eﬀective
combating strategies. While the current analyses shed light on a diverse set of business strategies
against counterfeits, there can be other strategies and other dimensions of asymmetric information
and implications associated with counterfeiting. I am making further attempts to better understand
counterfeiters’ decisions on market entry and any potential complementary eﬀects counterfeits could
have for authentic products.
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38Table 1. Stratiﬁed Estimations for log(Pt) on Lagged Entry
This table reports the IV estimates on the counterfeit entry eﬀect on the log of deﬂated authentic prices. All
models use company- and year-ﬁxed eﬀects. Each column represents a regression in a diﬀerent stratum classiﬁed
by the counterfeit quality of the brand, as speciﬁed in the column header. Columns 1 and 3 refer to the stratum
of brands infringed by low-quality counterfeits. Production cost is used to proxy quality. Columns 2 and 4 refer to
the stratum consisting of companies whose counterfeit quality is above the threshold level. Counterfeitt−2 dummy
equals 1 if counterfeit of a brand entered in year t-2; logCost is the authentic materials costs of products; m is the
counterfeit production cost divided by the authentic one; Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct
for clustering at the company level appear in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance levels: *-10%; **-5%; ***-1%.
Dependent variable: Log deﬂated high-end authentic prices Log deﬂated low-end authentic prices
Sample by Counterfeit Type Low-quality High-quality Low-quality High-quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Counterfeitt−2 .04*** .01 .06** .01*
(.02) (.06) (.03) (.01)
logCost .93*** .89*** .95*** .91***
(.02) (.03) (.01) (.02)
m -.09** -.59 -.08* -.63
(.04) (.61) (.05) (.47)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Obs. 324 120 324 120
1Table 2. IV Estimation on Shoe Quality
Panel A. Leather Shoes
Dependent variable: log Cost Overall Quality
Counterfeitt−2 .45*** 2.82***
(.12) (.51)
Company and Year Fixed Eﬀects Y Y
No. Obs. 3336 3336
R-square .95 .96
Panel B. Sports Shoes
Dependent variable: log Cost Overall Quality
Counterfeitt−2 .30*** 2.67***
(.09) (.25)
Company and Year Fixed Eﬀects Y Y
No. Obs. 3335 3335
R-square .92 .93
IV estimation on the counterfeit entry eﬀect on authentic quality, estimated by log deﬂated costs and the sum of
various shoe characteristics, with the interaction of government enforcement change and relationship proxy as the
main IV. Panel A reports results for the leather shoe sector, and Panel B reports those for the sport shoe sector.
2Table 3. Predicting Counterfeit Entry, Quantities, and Sales
The counterfeit entry dummy (equalling one if counterfeits are discovered for a brand), counterfeit sale quantity as a
fraction of the authentic sale quantity, and counterfeit sales are regressed on the set of covariates in Column 1, with
company ﬁxed eﬀects, in three separate regressions. Each column reports one regression speciﬁcation. lag licensed
store, lag sales, lag enforce, and lag cost are the lagged-year number of licensed stores, sales, enforcement investments,
and production costs for an authentic company; Real GDP per capita PPP, growth rates, and household consumption
(HHC) are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators. Gini coeﬃcients are extracted from the
UN Human Development Reports. Due to space limitations, this table does not include a few other control variables
in the regression model: Loose is a dummy for government enforcement change, which equals one from 1995 on;
Relation between a company and local government is proxied by the number of workdays between the application
and grant dates of the ISO certiﬁcate for an authentic company. These are not related to the message of this paper
and can be found in Qian (2006). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the
company level appear in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance levels: *-10%; **-5%; ***-1%.
Dependent Variable: Fake Entry Fake Q/Auth. Q log Fake Sales
(1) (2) (3)
Licensed storest−1 -.001* -.02*** -.01
(.000) (.005) (.02)
Salest−1 .04 .01 .52**
(.04) (.05) (.25)
Enforcet−1 -.000 -.01 -.003**
(.000) (.015) (.001)
Costt−1 .16 .27 -.25
(.13) (.20) (.93)
Log(GDPpcPPP) 3.4 2.55 18.3
(3.1) (4.36) (19.5)
Growth -.01 -.05 .02
(.03) (.05) (.23)
GINI .14** .07 1.32***
(.05) (.08) (.37)
Log(deﬂated HHC) .95 1.70 8.5
(.88) (1.22) (5.9)
Year Trend .22 -.43 -.01
(.24) (.25) (.08)
No. of Obs. 372 372 372
3Table 4: Fixed Eﬀects Reg for Authentic Firms’ Business Strategies on their Ties
with the Government
This table reports the OLS estimations. Post-1995 (loosened government enforcement) data are used. All models use year and company ﬁxed eﬀects. ISO is the
number of workdays an authentic company took to obtain the ISO certiﬁcate and proxies for the relationship between the company and the government. Various
authentic outcome variables are regressed on this proxy, in separate regressions. Each column reports one regression speciﬁcation. Column 1 reports entry eﬀects
on log advertisement costs, 2 for log number of licensed stores, 3 for log enforcement investments, and 4 for the log of unit production cost of the high-end shoe,
reﬂecting authentic quality. All nominal terms are deﬂated with CPI. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that correct for clustering at the company level
appear in parentheses.Statistical signiﬁcance levels: *-10%; **-5%; ***-1%. R-squre values from the two alternative regression speciﬁcations are similar, and I report
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation R-square in the last line.
Dependent variable: log(Adst) log(Storet) log(Enft) log(Ct) − log(Ct−1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ISO .001 .39** .004 .0003**
(.001) (.17) (.003) (.00015)
Year and Company Fixed Eﬀects Y Y Y Y
No. of Obs. 372 372 372 372
R-square 0.97 0.83 0.93 0.97
4